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1. Problem Description 
Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) such as GE, Rolls-Royce and Siemens have 
recognized the importance of after sales service [1]. These manufacturers pursue a product 
service strategy in which they actively promote services to enhance the value proposition of 
their product offering.  
 
As OEMs take over more and more maintenance activities of their customers, the 
maintenance organizations are becoming larger, more professional and more complex. This 
complexity is caused by the diversity of the machine park (installed base) that OEMs have to 
maintain. Typically the installed base will be scattered around the globe, contain a wide range 
of different machines that are supported by different technologies such as combustion or 
electronic engines, oil free or oil injected rotors. All these different technologies require 
specialized skills.  
 
In general, maintenance organizations have to deal with two types of tasks. On the one 
hand, they will need to fix machines that have failed (repairs or corrective maintenance). On 
the other hand, they will try to avoid failures by performing preventive maintenance. 
Contrary to preventive maintenance, repairs cannot be planned in advance and have to be 
dealt with in an "as soon as possible" manner. To highlight this difference we will indicate 
repairs with the term "emergencies" while preventive maintenance jobs are referred to as 
"non emergencies". In this research, the cross training policy under consideration is to decide 
on the optimal fraction of technicians to dedicate to non emergencies. Moreover, the 
professionalization of the aftermarket service industry has led to a surge in the use of multi-
period service contracts. In some of these contracts service providers take full responsibility 
for the functioning of the equipment. They will perform both preventive and corrective 
maintenance in order to maintain the machine, sometimes they are even giving up-time 
guarantees (performance based contracting). With such contracts in place, demand for service 
can be influenced by the OEM by setting proper maintenance policies and corresponding 
capacity levels. By taking responsibility for the entire maintenance of the machine, the OEM 
will be able to perform more preventive maintenance which translates itself in less repairs. 
By doing so, the OEM can steer its service organization towards more planned and less 
emergency activities. Therefore, comprehensive contracts offer the possibility to lower the 
uncertainty in the service demand which creates opportunities to optimize the service 
operations [2]. 
 
Advanced service providers have to make decisions concerning their workforce and the 
service product mix. How many technicians of the different skill levels need to be 
hired/trained? Which service products to offer? These questions are related: by performing 
more preventive maintenance the amount of breakdowns will go down, allowing a reduction 
in the workforce that can handle repairs but increasing the need for technicians to perform 
preventive maintenance. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the impact of 
selling comprehensive long term service contracts on the service performance and the 
capacity requirements in a field service system. We performed a simulation study to 
investigate the interdependency between the cross training decisions and the service product 
mix. More specifically, we investigate the impact of the maintenance policy, the workload 
(number of machines being maintained) and the machine reliability on the optimal cross 
training policy. Moreover, we evaluate the attractiveness of selling more comprehensive 
service contracts both in terms of capacity requirements as in terms of the service 
performance. In the following section we present the key characteristics of our simulation 
model. In section 3 we give a flavor of the results of this ongoing research. In the last section, 
we conclude. 
2. Field Service Model 
In this section we will present the simulation model that is constructed in order to 
evaluate the possibility to deploy technicians dedicated to preventive maintenance. We 
captured the essence of a field service organization with a discrete time simulation model 
created in ARENA 11.0. To safeguard the applicability of our results we used real-life data 
from an existing service region of an OEM in the compressed air and generator industry. In 
the following paragraphs the assumptions and performance measures of the model will be 
discussed. 
 
2.1 General Assumptions 
 
In the service region under consideration 10 technicians or field service engineers 
(FSE) work to serve an installed base of machines. A significant part of this installed base is 
covered by comprehensive service contracts in which the OEM is responsible for both 
emergency and non emergency service. Demand from machines covered by a contract (Dsc) is 
more predictable than the demand of machines without a contract (Dr). Both Dsc and Dr can 
be a request for emergency or non emergency service. The key difference is that Dsc is 
influenced by the maintenance policy and the system state, while Dr is independent of the 
OEM’s maintenance policy and the system state. Therefore, we let jobs of Dr arrive according 
to a Poisson process and once executed the jobs are discarded. Machines with a service 
contract are explicitly modeled as entities in a closed-loop queuing system comparable to the 
approach in Papadopoulos [3]. Non emergency jobs on a machine under contract arrive with 
a fixed time interval dependent on the contract terms and the yearly operating hours of the 
machine. On the contrary, emergency jobs on a machine under contract arrive based on a 
failure process (see further). Between the different types of jobs we use a non-preemptive 
allocation priority for emergency jobs.  
 
 There are two types of technicians, i.e. technicians dedicated to non emergency 
service (N FSE) and fully cross trained technicians (E FSE) that can handle both emergencies 
and non emergencies.  
 
One key advantage of non emergency jobs is the leeway in timely execution of these 
jobs. Preventive maintenance jobs are accepted to be on time if they are executed during an 
interval of 10% around the optimal preventive maintenance timing. This flexibility in timing 
of execution allows for non emergency jobs to be executed when there is idle capacity or to 
be postponed when work is piling up. Based on this reasoning and in order to capture the 
advantages of performing more preventive maintenance we allow that non emergency jobs 
can be started as soon as 10% before the timing foreseen in the maintenance contract (oj). 
However, when the job is postponed for longer than 10% of the maintenance interval the job 
is considered to have become an emergency. We assume that when a failure occurs during the 
10% interval around oj both the repair and the preventive maintenance are performed during 
the same intervention (opportunistic maintenance). 
2.2 Reliability of Machines 
To model the maintenance demand originating from machines covered by a service 
contract (Dsc), we use a competing risk framework [4]. In this framework a stochastic process 
representing failures and another representing preventive maintenance compete against each 
other to materialize.  
 
In order to model the time until the next failure after maintenance job j (Xj), we have 
to quantify the impact of maintenance on the failure rate (λ). In the standard competing risk 
approach it is assumed that each maintenance is perfect, i.e. after receiving maintenance the 
machine is as good as new (AGAN). In reality this is not the case, therefore we assume that 
after emergency maintenance the failure rate of the machine is the same as just before the 
failure which is a more plausible assumption. For non emergency maintenance we keep the 
assumption of AGAN maintenance. As a consequence, the failure intensity is determined by 
the time that has passed since the last preventive maintenance job on the machine (tpm). We 
assume that the failure intensity or hazard function can be modeled by the widely used Power 
Law Process [5]: 
 
                                                    .                                         (1) 
    with α = scale parameter 
            β = shape parameter 
 
For a Power Law intensity function the time to failure after a maintenance intervention j (Xj ) 
can be represented as a truncated Weibull distribution. 
 
                                                                            (2) 
 
The time to failure obtained in this way is in line with the Power Law process. We have 
linked the demand for service (emergency and non emergency) with the maintenance policy 
followed by the service provider. Moreover, the demand is dependent on the state of the 
service system. Indeed, when there is too much work to be done for the FSEs, preventive 
maintenance is stalled which will lead to more machines failures due to the increasing failure 
rate in function of tpm. 
3. Results 
In this section we discuss the results of our simulations. We tested the attractiveness of 
deploying technicians dedicated to non emergency maintenance in a wide range of scenarios. 
The scenarios differ in terms of the maintenance policy (maintenance frequency), the total 
workload and the reliability of the machines. In total we use 16 different scenarios for which 
the optimal cross training policy is determined. By doing so, we obtain insights about the 
factors that impact the cross training decision and the attractiveness of increasing the fraction 
of the installed base covered by a service contract. 
 
3.1 Direct and Indirect Impact of PM Dedicated Technicians 
 
To evaluate the service performance we use the average machine availability which 
can be derived from the simulation results. To test the performance of the different cross 
training possibilities we take the following approach: for each scenario we will start with 10 
E FSEs and gradually replace them with N FSEs. This evolution in the workforce mix can be 
captured by the ratio 
 
 
 
   with  the number of N FSE 
         the number of E FSE . 
 
When the number of technicians dedicated to non emergencies (Sn) increases the ratio 
goes up. We opted to maximize the service performance while keeping the budget for FSE 
constant. As a consequence, we start with a situation of 10 fully cross trained technicians 
(budget fully used) and progressively switch fully cross trained technicians for dedicated 
ones. Thanks to the fact that the cost of a N FSE amount only to 2/3 of the cost of an E FSE, 
two E FSEs can be replaced by three N FSE without exceeding the budget. So after switching 
one E FSE for one N FSE ( , we can replace two E FSE by three N FSE 
, ... Among these workforce configurations we then select the one which 
achieves the highest average availability for the machines under contract. 
 
Having more N FSEs on the payroll can improve the timely execution of preventive 
maintenance jobs. This is a consequence of the fact that E FSEs give priority to emergencies 
before non emergencies. Therefore, if there is a capacity shortage preventive maintenance 
jobs are the first to be postponed. This however endangers the timely execution of preventive 
maintenance. Without timely execution of preventive maintenance, the total number of 
emergencies rises due to machine breakdowns. This will in turn increase the need to postpone 
some jobs, once again endangering timely preventive maintenance and further increasing the 
number of emergencies ... The use of N FSEs can avoid this "emergency trap" of an 
escalating number of emergencies due to postponement of preventive maintenance. 
Replacing E FSEs by N FSEs has a direct and an indirect effect. Obviously, the lower number 
of technicians to handle emergencies will increase the response time for these emergencies 
while lowering the response time for non emergencies (direct effect). On the other hand, the 
improvement in timely preventive maintenance will reduce the total number of emergencies 
which will reduce the response time for the remaining emergencies. This indirect effect of 
timely preventive maintenance on the number of emergencies may tip the balance in favor of 
employing more dedicated technicians. 
 
Figure 1 shows the average availability for the scenario with preventive maintenance 
after each 3000 operating hours, a hazard function of PL(3175,5) and a high workload. The 
first FSEs which are reserved to perform only preventive maintenance strongly reduce the 
response time of both non emergencies and emergencies. As these FSEs will focus on non 
emergency service a lot of emergencies will be avoided (indirect effect), offsetting the 
increase in emergency response time due to the reduction of E FSEs (direct effect). So the 
introduction of the first N FSE increases the availability. But as the proportion of N FSE 
increases the positive effect on the number of emergencies decreases. The response time of 
non emergencies continues to decrease but this positive effect is canceled out by the increase 
in emergency response time. The increasing response time for emergencies deteriorates the 
availability of the machines. From figure 1 it is clear that a FSE configuration with a Rn of 
0,27 is optimal with respect to the machine availability. 
  
 
Fig. 1. Service performance with increasing specialization with high workload 
 
3.2 Factors Influencing the Cross Training Policy 
 
It became clear from our simulation results that the evolution as shown in figure 1 strongly 
depends on the workload, i.e. if a high number of machines needs to be maintained deploying 
N FSE becomes more attractive. This observation can be explained by the fact that when the 
workload is not high, the E FSEs will have plenty of time to perform the non emergency 
services in a timely matter. It is only when E FSEs are overwhelmed by work that they will 
be pre-occupied by emergencies and neglect preventive maintenance. With the spotlight on 
emergencies, preventive maintenance will be postponed, further increasing the workload as 
more and more machines fail. The fact that the workload plays a leading role in determining 
the cross training policy collides with the conclusion of Chakravarthy and Agnihothri [6] who 
found that the utilization rate of the technicians is a crucial parameter for the optimal cross 
training policy. 
 
Although a high workload can justify the deployment of N FSE, N FSE can be attractive 
even with a standard workload but only if the machines are highly reliable, i.e. there are very 
few emergencies. Furthermore, also the machine failure characteristics around the time of 
preventive maintenance play a role. Once the timely execution of preventive maintenance is 
jeopardized, the optimal amount of N FSE to deploy increases, if the reliability degrades 
faster around the time of preventive maintenance.  
 
3.3 Impact of Increased Contract Coverage 
 
Following their desire to increase the service business, servitizing companies will actively 
promote the use of service contracts. But how to assess the attractiveness of such a strategy 
and what are the implications for the cross training policy? 
 
By adapting the demand in our simulation model by decreasing the demand of service 
outside a service contract (Dr) and putting more machines under a contract (Dsc), we can 
evaluate the impact of an increased level of servitization (more contract selling). Increasing 
the contract coverage (in most cases) leads to an increase of the fraction of non emergency 
interventions compared to emergencies. This creates the possibility to optimize the service 
operations (capacity) and deliver better service performance to customers. Once again, the 
combination of the maintenance policy and the reliability of the machines will determine the 
size of both the direct and indirect effect of adding N FSE. By using the failure function and 
the failure counting processes, we are able to mathematically derive estimations of these 
effects and accordingly the impact of increasing the contract coverage on the service 
performance. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we reported on the main results of a simulation study in which we modeled 
the field service operations of an OEM in the compressed air and generator industry. The 
simulation model takes into account some of the key characteristics of field service systems 
such as traveling, job allocation in discrete time and the use of long term service contracts 
that combine preventive and corrective maintenance. As maintenance providers feel the 
pressure to deliver excellent service while containing costs, determining the optimal cross 
training policy becomes vital.  
 
We evaluated the impact of the workload, the machine reliability, and the maintenance 
policy on the cross training policy based on the service performance using realistic data 
values. The deployment of technicians dedicated to preventive maintenance (non 
emergencies) avoids that preventive maintenance is postponed too long due to more urgent 
machine failures. The timely execution of preventive maintenance on his turn will lower the 
total amount of machine failures possibly offsetting the negative effect of having less fully 
skilled technicians. Employing technicians dedicated to preventive maintenance turns out to 
be optimal if the workload is high or when the machines are highly reliable up to the time of 
preventive maintenance. Increasing the contract coverage of the installed base can be a 
worthwhile strategy if the maintenance policy is well suited for the reliability characteristics 
of the machines.  
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